To Be Some Other Name: The Naming Games that Hijras Play by Saria, Vaibhav
 
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic
Journal 
12 | 2015
On Names in South Asia: Iteration, (Im)propriety and
Dissimulation








Association pour la recherche sur l'Asie du Sud (ARAS)
 
Electronic reference
Vaibhav Saria, « To Be Some Other Name: The Naming Games that Hijras Play », South Asia
Multidisciplinary Academic Journal [Online], 12 | 2015, Online since 12 March 2019, connection on 30
April 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/samaj/3992  ; DOI : 10.4000/samaj.3992 
This text was automatically generated on 30 April 2019.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0
International License.
To Be Some Other Name: The
Naming Games that Hijras Play
Vaibhav Saria
1 Although the hijras appear as a generic category in much official and scholarly discourse
that renders them as the ‘third gender,’ members of these communities themselves pay
close  attention  to  the  multiple  criteria  through  which  one  hijra  body  might  be
distinguished from another.1 This kind of differentiation is reiterated in common talk
among the hijras and relates to the moral economy of izzat,2 or honor. Of the multiple
signs through which hijras make their bodies and their sexuality apparent in both the
public domain and in interpersonal relations,  proper names play a significant role in
marking the place of the hijras in the wider sexual economy and also for indexing the
changes in the status of a particular person through the life course. From the outside, it
might appear that the boundaries of the hijra community are well-defined but from the
inside, the community is haunted by questions about who is an asli (real/true) hijra and
who might be a nakli or false one (false in the sense of an impostor or a duplicate which
carries with it a moral charge of cheating). Distinctions are made through reading very
closely the multiple alterations of bodies through surgical and medical interventions, the
movement  between  names,  and  the  volatility  of  relations  in  which  different  sub-
communities of hijras are implicated, for differentiating hijra bodies and selves. In this
volatile play of who one is,  questions about asli and nakli are not simply about social
identities but about one’s existence as genuine or fake.
2 This  paper  is  based  on  ethnographic  fieldwork  I  conducted  between  2008  and  2010
intermittently and then without any break for a further period between 2011 and 2013
amongst hijra groups in three rural districts of Orissa—Bhadrak, Jajpur, and Kalahandi.
Before  my fieldwork in  Orissa,  I  belonged to  the  community  of  sexual  minorities  in
Calcutta that organized various public events demanding recognition from the state. This
is how I first came to register the mutual suspicion among hijras about who is a true hijra.
For  instance,  Shonali,  a  hijra  guru  in  Bhadrak,  did not  consider  the  other  hijras  of
Bhadrak asli (genuine) because they were married to women,3 while hijras in Jajpur did
not consider any of the hijras of the Bhadrak, including Shonali, asli because, while they
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were organized as a household, they were not members of one of the recognized hijra
gharanas (lineages).4 Meanwhile, the hijras of Calcutta did not consider any of the hijras
from Orissa asli because they earned their living by begging on trains instead of through
more respectable activities such as offering their blessings at auspicious occasions such as
weddings and childbirth. Also of acute importance in these contestations over asli/nakli
hijras was the state of a hijra’s genitalia. Certain hijras who had gone through the ritual of
castration, called nirvan hijras, did not consider those who had not to be asli hijras, or
even hijras at all,  dismissing them as kothis  (effeminate men) or in moments of  high
tension and conflict as gandus (sodomites).5 Furthermore, hijras who were congenitally
third gender often claimed that they alone were asli hijras. Differences between different
kinds  of  thirdness  were  also  marked  through  participation  in  regional  traditions  of
theatre and performance:  jankhas,  jogtas and bhands  (actors who impersonate women)
were differentiated from asli hijras or absorbed into the category depending upon context
(Cohen 1995, Nanda 1999, Pament 2013). Historically, it was this overlap between hijras
and participants in various regional traditions of performance that prompted the colonial
policing of  the hijra  in public  spaces  but  also resulted in hijras  devising tactics  and
strategies to evade such policing such as wearing female clothing only in areas beyond
British rule or in the privacy of  their  homes (Hinchy 2014).  Furthermore,  globalizing
discourses on sex and gender lead to the increasing vernacularization of categories such
as ‘Men who have sex with men’ (Boellestorff 2011) and ‘transgender,’ thus making any
neat categorization of the ‘third gender’ impossible. These complex forces lead us to ask
what work the asli-nakli dynamic performs and how proper names are drawn into it?
 
Ritual and play
3 While there is some mention in earlier ethnographies of hijra practices of name changing
(from the male name given at birth to a female one) they have not received sustained
attention. In addition to describing traditional practices of naming I seek here to extend
the discussion by examining how hijras encounter the state and judiciary through the
names they bear and how definitions of asliness and nakliness arise and dissolve in these
sites.
4 A hijra’s decision to join a hijra household as a disciple [cela] to a guru culminates in the
ritual of putting rit in that particular household under that guru and it is through this
ritual that celas establish their kinship with their gurus. Part of the ritual is to ask the
initiate what she would want as her new name. This change in name consolidates the
asliness of a hijra and transforms her relation to the local moral world around her as an
ascetic because in addition to moving away from her natal village to live with a hijra
community  elsewhere,  usually  in  a  city,  the  hijra  also  gives  up  her  surname  and
consequently her gotra and caste (Nanda 1992: 33–52). While this is the most important
instance of the changing of names, it is not the only one in a hijra’s life. Hijras also change
their names as they switch from one guru to another, or from one hijra household to
another due to an altercation with the guru. For example, Kalavati, a senior cela (disciple)
of a hijra guru in Jajpur, was thrown out of the hijra household there in the following
manner. Her fellow cela, a hijra named Sandhya, had fallen in love with a man who was
already in a relationship with another cela of  the same household,  Chandni.  Sandhya
seduced the young man and embarked on an affair, which led to him eventually leaving
Chandni for her. A fight quickly ensued between the two hijras over the young man after
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Sandhya’s  affair  and  betrayal  of  her  fellow  cela  was  discovered.  Since  Sandhya  and
Chandni lived in the same house with Guruma (the guru) and nine of her other celas and
nati-celas,6 including Kalavati, the household was quickly divided with each hijra aligning
herself with either Sandhya or Chandni. Guruma, in order to broker some peace, had
penalized Sandhya for  seducing her fellow cela’s partner but  had not  commented on
whether  she  would  allow  Sandhya  to  continue  her  relationship.  Later  in  the  week,
Kalavati not only encouraged Sandhya to get married to her lover but also took them to
the marriage registrar where she signed the marriage certificate as a witness. When this
came to light,  another fight ensued and Guruma, now even more enraged, saw fit  to
penalize Kalavati as well for instigating the affair. Kalavati promptly ran away to Bhadrak
(my field site)  in the middle of  the night and asked for shelter and protection from
Shonali, the hijra guru in Bhadrak. Shonali took on Kalavati as a cela and after undergoing
the ritual of rit; she was given a new name—Kaajal. Another instance of changing names
following a dispute took place during my fieldwork when Lakshmi, a young hijra from
Bhadrak, left her guru Priya,  with whom she had lived in the neighboring district of
Jalasore, and returned to her natal home. I greeted her and asked her how she was doing,
addressing her by the name Lakshmi, as she had been known. She did not respond and
after a few minutes said, ‘Lakshmi died, she was Priya’s cela. I am Madhabi.’
5 I read this changing of names as ritualized games that hijras play. By ‘ritualized’ I mean to
emphasize that names were not changed on a whim but carried the structural features of
transitions that mark a change in the hijra’s status and were accompanied by rituals that
facilitated such change. By characterizing these as ‘games’ I wish to indicate the register
of the subjunctive that often meets its limits in the actual in the sense that the previous
name continues to cling to the hijra, defining obligations that she was trying to escape. I
noted in many cases that in spite of the name changing rituals they underwent, hijras
could not simply shed the pasts in which their earlier names were implicated.7 While the
renaming  might  have  allowed  a  hijra  to  temporarily  walk  away  from  the  fights,
conversations,  and the form of  non-biological  kinship that  hijras  practice,  it  did not
generate a completely new person. In Madhabi’s case, she could not become Priya’s cela
again even with a new name, despite her ardent wish to do so. While Lakshmi signaled the
break from Priya by taking a new name, neither Priya nor the community could erase the
memory of the wounding fight that had led to the severing of relations between her guru
and her previous self. In later conversations with me, Priya would often use the name
Lakshmi and not Madhabi as she cursed her, using abusive language about her as if the
new name and the person bearing that name did not exist for her. Similarly, Kalavati’s
new name did not mean that she could escape the fine and punishment that was meted
out to her by her former guru. She was caught by the hijras of Jajpur and brought back to
undergo the humiliating ritual of expulsion that would strip her of her membership from
that household. This rite involved returning the tweezers, called darsan, that hijra celas
are given by their guru, paying an exorbitant fine, and finally undergoing the humiliating
rite called thuk ke chatna in which the cela is required to spit on the hijra guru’s feet and
forced to lick them clean. It was only after begging forgiveness and undergoing this ritual
that she was allowed to return to Bhadrak to her new guru as Kaajal.
6 The  analogy  between  ritual  and  play  has  been  used  by  scholars  to  show the  ‘as  if’
character  of  ritual  enactments.  Seligman et al.  (2008: 20)  propose that  we understand
‘ritual as a subjunctive—the creation of an order as if it were truly the case.’ They further
argue that though ‘the subjunctive world created by ritual is always doomed ultimately to
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fail’ because it ‘can never fully replace the broken world of experience,’ the practice of
rituals not only gives us temporary respite from this brokenness but also equips us to
deal with them (Seligman et al. 2008: 31). Building on this insight I want to argue that the
changing of names also has an as-if character in that it reveals a particular modality—that
of playfulness as the mode in which one engages one’s past. The new names of hijras
enacted an ‘as if’ self—one that could be completely severed from its past, but like the
subjunctive in rituals, these names, too, failed to accomplish a complete break from the
past in the face of the real world. Kalavati and Priya could not escape humiliation and
punishment at the hands of their gurus. However, the ultimate failure of ritual games—
the hardness of the real as it hits against the wishful construction of new identities—came
to  the  fore  most  forcefully  in  accusative  discourses of  asli-nakli when  hijras  had  to
confront the institutions of the state. As we shall see below, the male names of hijras
persisted and resurfaced in such moments leaving them vulnerable to accusations of
being nakli while also reminding them of  their  erstwhile male names and what they
constituted and entailed.
 
The names I was called
7 In recent years there has been a concerted effort on the part of both national and state
level government to include hijras in its various schemes addressing poverty, inequality
and corruption. This is evident in the attempt to include hijras in the 2011 census of
India, and in schemes such as the Unique Identification Number, through provision of a
box labeled ‘other’ alongside ‘male’ and ‘female.’ This box labeled ‘other’ for the hijra to
mark is duplicated across various sites of the state from identification cards to—most
recently—passports.  These  efforts  to  render  the  hijra  commensurable  with  the  state
culminated in the 2012 landmark case of National Legal Services Authority vs the Union
of India, which recognized third gender citizens and granted them equal fundamental
rights (writ petition (civil) no. 400 of 2012). Yet these efforts towards commensurability
paradoxically create conditions ripe for the enactment of violence on and violation of the
hijra body.
8 The state’s efforts to provide its services to the hijra conjoin with the logic of rendering
them  as  a  population to  be  documented  and  enumerated  through  technologies  of
governmentality. But these efforts to bring hijras under the governmental gaze come up
against the fact that hijras change their names multiple times. Since various officials,
both from state institutions such as the DAPCU (District AIDS Prevention Control Unit)
and NGOs who run programs related to  prevention and treatment  of  HIV and AIDS,
assume that the female names taken by hijras are not stable they assign the male names
that the hijras were given at birth on official documents as proof of identity. This created
a new set of problems that I witnessed during my fieldwork. For instance, since hijras
were  recruited  as  local  experts  for  HIV prevention,  they  were  required  to  travel  to
various places and needed government issued documents to prove identity. A prominent
NGO in Bhadrak arranged for identification papers for the hijras,  but the documents
carried the male names given to them at birth. In one instance, the male name created an
embarrassing  situation for  Lovely,  for  even if  she  travelled  in  male  clothes  she  had
already modified her body through the use of hormones to the extent that she would not,
at first glance, be identified as a man. She was forced to confess to the official at the
airport that she was a hijra and had to endure the humiliating staring, whispering and
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giggling that ensued amongst various airport officials.  Another transgendered person
told me,
Since all my documents are in my male name, I stood in the security line for male
people but  then the guard screamed,  ‘Madam this  is  for  men,  your line is  over
there.’  It  is so embarrassing; people stare at you, wondering what is happening.
They begin whispering, everybody’s attention is on you. Now I always go to the
female line and there when I am in the booth, I tell the lady. ‘I am like this, you tell
me what to do, should I go to that line or stay here.’ Usually, the lady officer just
says, ‘No problem, arre you look just like a woman.’
9  Hijras in Bhadrak and Jajpur usually travel on trains and in groups. Given that begging in
trains is common among hijras in Orissa, they were well known to railway officials and
conductors. This familiarity did not always prevent violence, thus, hijras were always
prepared for some altercation. This preparedness was usually signaled by the way hijras
announced themselves in the trains;  by their loud claps that served as identification
enough. In other spaces that required state documentation, such as airports, the male
names on official documents spelt trouble since the names (male) and the looks (female)
did not match. The disjuncture evoked the suspicion of something clandestine: were their
names and documents asli or nakli—real or forged? Let me provide one more example of
how the  asli-nakli  dynamic  became linked with  the  male  names  of  hijras.  When the
officials collecting data for the 2011 census reached the districts of Jajpur, they insisted
on recording the male names of the hijras who lived in one of the hijra households. A
hijra who worked as a school teacher in her village before joining the Jajpur household
told me, ‘I read in the newspaper that there was an option for ‘other’ in the census, so I
asked the man why he was marking us as ‘male’ instead of using the option of recording
us as hijras.’ The man told her, ‘oh, hijras are men.’ In the ensuing argument the official
demanded to see whether they were castrated as proof of their being hijras. Since a lot of
the young hijras had not undergone the ritual  of  castration,  they were made to feel
ashamed and ended up being counted as males. Recently hijras have begun to respond to
these pressures for a stable name by using the word Kinnar as their last name, which, as I
mentioned above, they have to give up when taking a hijra name. However, since local
officials hold on to certain ideas of asli and nakli as this example demonstrates, hijras
mostly end up using the male name for official purposes.8
10  The resurgence of the hijras’ male names not only rehearses the limits under which the
state’s imagination of the hijra and her body function, but also indexes a suspicion of
criminality. I proceed now to (re)assemble a number of recent court cases in which hijras
were implicated in crimes of  murder and bodily  harm against  either other hijras  or
against clients and lovers.
 
The hijra and the hands of justice
11  My interest in the presence of the hijra in the legal archive began when Shamsheri, a
hijra in Bhadrak, showed me certain legal documents relating to her divorce from her
wife. Shamsheri had been convinced by her elder brother to take on his mistress as her
wife. The marriage was a ruse to provide cover for the mistress’s pregnancy resulting
from her clandestine relations with Shamsheri’s already married brother. Shamsheri was
willing to do this favor for her brother who wished to continue the relationship with his
mistress.  This  amicable  arrangement  between the  brothers  and  the  mistress  quickly
soured when the elder brother wanted to end the relationship. The document Shamsheri
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showed me was an order sheet issued by the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, which is the
second lowest  criminal  court  in India.  The order sheet  had the pronouncement that
Shamsheri had to pay 1500 rupees as maintenance to her wife. The issue of maintenance
had been brought under the criminal court because Shamsheri’s wife, wishing to avenge
herself on her former lover, had charged Shamsheri with domestic violence, a criminal
offense under section 498 of the Indian Penal Code. In addition, Shamsheri was accused of
making demands for dowry, which once again was a criminal offense. Nowhere in the
documents was Shamsheri identified as a hijra. Her male name was used for the entire
proceeding and gave the impression that it was a case of a man who allegedly tortured his
wife for dowry, beat her and threatened to abandon her to a life of destitution if she left
him. While this might be an instance of the law refusing to recognize Shamsheri as a hijra
because she was married to a woman, it raises questions pertinent to the cases I cite
below which indicate different patterns in the use of male or hijra names depending on
whether the hijra stands before the court as an accused or as a victim or witness of crime.
12  Pratiksha Baxi,  in her recent work on the juridical construction of rape, argues that
‘juridical categories, incommensurable with the survivor’s experience, deployed during
the rape trial, convert rape into sex and sex into rape’ (Baxi 2014: 346). The court, Baxi
shows, relies on a certain set of fictions of the body and persons to judge whether the
victim was raped or not. Any deviation from a certain recognized narrative of violence
offered in the process of adjudication creates doubt on the claim of rape resulting in high
rates of  acquittal.  In other words,  if  the story of  the rape does not  accord with the
preconceptions of what a rape victim’s behavior must be like, then the courts are likely to
conclude that the sex was consensual and the woman faked the story of rape to cover up
consensual sex. I want to extend this argument in order to ask how the court adjudicates
the asliness and nakliness of hijras as a way of establishing criminality and its implications.
13 A survey of the reported appellate judgments that deal with hijras reveals an intriguing
pattern in the circulation of their male and female names. Since only the judgments of
high courts and the Supreme Court are reported, and even then only upon the judge’s
recommendation, it is not surprising that most of the cases in which hijras appear as the
accused  deal  with  a  serious  criminal  offence, such  as  murder.  Apart  from reported
judgments, the High Court also hears appeals to judgments that were delivered by lower
courts, so we also have access to part of the legal proceedings in the appellate courts that
become archived in the public record. A brief survey of these documents reveals how the
law imagines the relation between naming and the body. Otherwise stated, the question
is, how do courts name identity and locate criminality in the name?9
14 Take the case of Mantori @ Noor Mohd. vs State (MANU/DE/1525/2009) in which the
hijras named Mantori and Bijli were held guilty of the murder of another hijra named
Rekha. While Mantori and Bijli  have their male names, Noor Mohammod and Laccho,
respectively, recorded, Rekha’s male name is not given. The facts of the case were that in
1989, Rekha, who was a disciple of Bijli, was murdered by Mantori and her guru. The body
was discovered in a jungle near the Idgah Mehrauli in Delhi by a patrolling chowkidar.
The document is striking because of the pattern in which it names people who were
involved in the crime. The male names of Mantori and Bijli are affixed like aliases in the
document, but several other hijras, like the victim, Rekha, or the witnesses Meena and
Anita, do not have their male names recorded. Whilst recording the multiple names of a
person might be part and parcel of legal proceedings that must identify a criminal, the
male names of hijras are not aliases—they are actively suppressed by hijras themselves
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because it is precisely leaving that name behind that is part of their transformation into a
hijra.
15 We see how legal documents record the male names of hijras in ways, which suggest they
are equivalent to each other,  like aliases,  in several other cases.  Thus,  in the case of
Shabbir @ Neha vs State Govt. of NCT of Delhi (MANU/DE/3909/2012), Neha and a fellow
hijra, identified in the document as Om Prakash also known as Helen, are accused of
killing their customer Atiq in Woodland Park. The difference between a hijra and a man is
erased by linking the excised male name as alias with the female name to generate a
suspicion of nakliness that is confirmed by their criminality. This erasure is achieved by
mentioning the male name of the hijra as if it had a bearing on the case. In the case ‘Vijay
urf Rupa Kinnar versus the state of Allahabad’ (Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 2156 of
2010 (2010) H.C. Allahabad), Rupa and her friend Manbhari (identified in the document
with an alias—Akbar) were accused of killing an unnamed hijra. A witness, Jodh Singh,
saw them carry the dead body at midnight. We can tell that the court recognized the
persons concerned as hijras because the Additional Government Advocate had ‘argued
that the applicants had motive for committing the crime, as there was some monetary
dispute between the parties, who were eunuchs.’  The linking of the male names with
female names, even when recognizing the persons concerned in the case as hijras, implies
a relationship between criminality and maleness, which would raise doubts of asliness.
16  We can see this implication in the case Kashmira @ Salim vs. State (Delhi High Court,
Criminal  Appeal  No.  725/2005)  in  which  Kashmira  is  accused  and later  convicted  of
murdering a certain Daya Ram. I find it interesting that the court found it necessary to
record that ‘Kashmira used to dress up as female and claimed that she was the wife of
Daya Ram.’ Given that hijras are expected to dress in female attire and have husbands,
such specific mention of Kashmira’s propensity to do just that, makes her hijraness nakli
and reduces the facts of her existence to a spurious claim or disguise. While none of the
documents show a conscious intention on the part of the law to render hijra criminals
nakli, the circulation of her male name as an alias signals towards her nakliness because
they refigure the hijra as a male who is in the guise of a female rather than a hijra with a
female name.
17  It is not that hijras do not or cannot have male names—demanding that the hijra have a
female name would replicate calls for asliness and denunciations of nakliness. Since hijra
identities and bodies change slowly over time, pill by pill, and through decisions both big
and small that range from the sartorial to the familial, it is quite possible that the hijra
has different names and different genders in different documents. She may have a male
name and gender recorded on her birth certificate but a female name and gender on her
bank account documents, while being marked ‘other’ on her passport and Aadhaar card.10
The fact  that  the male name of  the hijra is  recorded only to impute a cause to her
criminality renders the male name as evidential rather than incidental to a hijra’s life.
18 The attribution of  a  male  identity  to  the criminal  seems to  accord with the judicial
presumption that criminality is more ‘natural to the male’ than the female as argued by
Veena Das (1996) in her study of rape trials in India. Das remarks that ‘in the process of
judicial verification, courts construct the category of young males, who are acting out
their impulses and ‘irrepressible sexual urges’ when they rape women’ (2420). If the law
mitigates the violence committed by young men by naturalizing their  sexuality then
could we also argue that the law in the cases cited above adheres to a gendered etiology
of  violence?  By citing the male  names of  hijras  it  adheres  to  a  conceptualization of
To Be Some Other Name: The Naming Games that Hijras Play
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 12 | 2015
7
maleness  that  is  defined  by  its  propensity  towards  violence.  By  discounting
intentionality, I am relying on the notion of the ‘juridical unconscious’ as put forward by
Felman (2002: 57), who writes that ‘Legal memory is constituted, in effect, not just by the
‘chain of law’ and by the conscious repetition of precedents but also by a forgotten chain
of  cultural  wounds and by compulsive or  unconscious legal  repetitions  of  traumatic,
wounding legal cases.’ I want to invoke this unawareness that the law has regarding itself
in order to understand its underlying commitment to sex and biology that renders them
true and everything else derivative and virtual. I shall return to this point in the next
section.
19 The maleness of the hijra that is unconsciously implied through the use of her male name
as a criminal alias is further thrown into relief when we see that hijras are allowed to
keep their  hijra  names only in  instances  when they are  dead or  when they are  not
accused of crimes. So for example, in the case of State vs Shree aka Mani Gopal (MANU/
DE/1918/2009), Neelam, a single-named hijra who was a witness to the murder of another
single-named hijra called Zareena, is shot dead by the multiply-named criminal Shree
Gopal aka Mani. Thus, it cannot be that it is usual procedure to collect the male names of
hijras to ensure their asliness. It could be argued that given that the male names of hijras
are actively suppressed it would be impossible to discover and record them in the case of
their death if their family members could not be tracked. We do not see police recording
the male names of hijras who are alive and are witnesses to crime either—but surely there
is a stake in verifying the identity of victims and witnesses? Even where the male name of
the hijra can be recorded because of access to family members it is not if her criminality
is not at stake. For instance, in the case Babu Lal vs the State (Rajasthan High Court,
Criminal Appeal no. 870/2005), a woman named Ratni Devi is killed by one of her sons,
either Ramesh or Babu Lal aka Pappu. The hijra offspring called Susheela is a witness in




20 Let  me  turn  now  to  how  the  law  qualifies  the  nakliness of  the  hijra  criminal  by
consolidating her male name through sex and biology. Given that the popular definition
and understanding of hijras reduces them to their castrated status, it is possible that
police officers when reporting the hijra murderers had insisted on checking whether the
hijra criminal was castrated or not and that the male name of the hijra was attached to
the criminal upon finding them uncastrated. This form of harassment is routine even
when  there  is  no  crime  committed.  For  example,  during  my  fieldwork  in  the  rural
districts of Orissa, I found that the police would regularly patrol the spots where hijras
solicit  customers  and  force  them to  remove  their  clothes.  Upon finding  them (still)
uncastrated, they would be taken to the police station and threatened with being put in
jail. The hijras would plead for mercy and pay a bribe to be set free.11 I note that none of
the court documents that I have cited mention whether the hijra was castrated or not.
Thus, the effect of maleness was produced here primarily through language or, more
specifically,  by  the  interpellation of  the  hijra  by her  male  name.  The implication of
biology through language is clearly seen in the case Kumkum vs State (Delhi High Court,
Criminal Revision Petition 414/2010). The judgment upheld the sentence of imprisonment
for one year,  meted out because Kumkum was caught begging and booked under the
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Bombay Prevention of Begging Act, 1959. Throughout the petition Kumkum was called a
‘male hizara (sic),’ which I take to mean that she was not castrated.
21 Let me further illustrate how the biology and sex of hijras is produced in the context of
law and criminality. Pravallika, a hijra, was murdered on January 17, 2015, in Hyderabad.
While reports of this murder were carried by many English language dailies, the details of
the case that emerged later were only reported via online NGO networks and statements
released  by  the  Telangana  Hijra  Transgender  Samiti  (THTS).  The  statement  went  as
follows:
On the evening of Tuesday, 20th January 2015 i.e. yesterday, our friend, a Hijra sex
worker  was  taken  away  for  interrogation  to  the  KPHB  police  station.  She  is  a
colleague and friend of the late Pravallika and us. On the pretext of interrogation,
the police blamed her for conspiring to murder Pravallika and resorted to sub-
human methods. The police caught her while she was returning home from her hot
spot and confiscated her mobile first to ensure that she couldn’t contact anyone for
help. The police had themselves urged her in our presence at the Gandhi hospital
mortuary  to  continue  going  to  the  hot  spot.  We  were  a  minimum  of  20  who
witnessed  this  request  from  the  police.  They  said  that  they  suspected  that
Pravallika may have been murdered by her clients and hence wanted to use our
Hijra friend as a bait and a decoy. Despite this,  she was treated like a criminal,
DENUDED by policemen with the alleged reason of ‘checking whether or not she
was  really  a  transwoman.’  She  had  to  remain  nude  for  4–5  hours  as  they
manhandled and tortured her, questioning her transidentity all through, as she was
uncastrated. She told them that transidentity cannot and should not be restricted
to  a  person  body  or  be  reduced  to  one’s  anatomy  as  enshrined in  the  NALSA
judgement  but  the  police  demonstrated  total  disregard  for  the  NALSA  vs.  UOI
judgement of the Supreme court.
Naked as she was in the biting cold of a wintry night, she pleaded for her clothes
but they couldn’t care. Finally, with no other option left, she was constrained to
reveal her HIV+ve status and explain that she is highly vulnerable to infections and
that she can’t afford to be nude for so long in such cold weather. Sadly, that too fell
on deaf ears. This only resulted in them keeping a safe distance from her having
masked their noses and mouths but they didn’t return her clothes to her. Our sister
transgender is very ill now and struggling the consequences of this torture.
Pravallika’s  mobile  is  now  on  surveillance  after  her  death.  Preliminary
investigations revealed that some police personnel were in touch with her before
her  murder.  They  claimed  to  be  ‘just  her  friends.’  It  is  nothing  new  that  the
policemen who harass and torture Hijra people often seek free sexual favors from
them  and  call  themselves  just  their  friends  when  found  in  such  compromising
situations. With this coming to light and the unusual urgency shown by the police
to paint this case as an ‘intra-hijra feud leading to Pravallika’s murder,’ the very
role of the police appears suspect and perhaps complicit in this crime.
As much as we would like to and wish to, we ARE NOT ABLE TO TRUST the police
anymore and demand that the following at the earliest:
1.  Judicial  enquiry  for  a  free,  fair  and  transparent  investigation  of  Pravallika’s
murder
2. Release of the post mortem report and FIR
3. Speedy implementation of the NALSA judgement
The statement made by the THTS shows us how the biology of the hijra can be conjured
up to fit the asli-nakli dynamic and consequently be used to locate violence. Pravallika’s 
asliness goes unquestioned when it can easily be argued that perhaps her nakliness was the
reason for her murder, especially if it was an ‘intra-hijra feud’—violence between hijra
groups sometimes pivot around accusations of nakliness. The tortured hijra’s penis not
only becomes evidence for her nakliness but is also taken as evidence for a propensity
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towards violence.  The penis is made to appear when criminality needs to be proven,
though it disappears in the context of intimacy and sexual transactions. For instance, in
the context of sexual interest, men would often refer to the hijra’s anatomy explicitly as
female; they would talk about her breasts, her vagina and her capacity to give birth. The
protocols of flirting would never allow for enquiring after the presence or absence of the
hijra’s penis.12
22 The appearance of the hijra penis in contexts of murder and disappearance in contexts of
sexual transactions between ‘friends’ implies that there is a critical distance between the
penis and the phallus and that a change in context allows the former to become the
latter. It is helpful here to return to Butler’s (2002) emphasis on the distance as well as
the relationship between the phallus and the penis. As is well known, Butler argues that
‘the law is not simply a cultural imposition on an otherwise natural heterogeneity; the
law requires conformity to its own notion of ‘nature’ and gains its legitimacy through the
binary and asymmetrical naturalization of bodies in which the Phallus, though clearly not
identical with the penis, nevertheless deploys the penis as its naturalized instrument and
sign’  (2002: 135).  The  hijra’s  penis  only  appeared  as  a  phallus  when  legal  contexts
demanded a signification of violence, which in the cases described above was murder, and
was  achieved  through  male  names.  Such  signification  marks  the  presupposition  of
maleness and its inherent propensity towards violence. The penis is evacuated of the
symbolic  phallus  when  intimacy  and/or  sexual  transactions  are  the  orders  of  the
moment. Let me explain this further.
23 Leo Bersani in his article on Almodovar’s film All About my Mother calls attention to the
presence of the penis on the bodies of several transsexuals in order to ask whether these
penises constitute the paternal phallus or conversely should be seen as contesting the
symbolic. He studies the scene in which several women, with and without penises, are
talking about the penis and ‘make it an object of fun, not exactly something to be made
fun of, but rather something to have fun with’ (2010: 77). Bersani offers the provocation
that, ‘Unlike the absent father and the fantasmatic phallus, the Almodovarian penis is
present even where, in principle, it should not be: on the bodies of such (at least self-
proclaimed)  women  as  Agrado  and  Lola.  The  penis’s  many  reoccurrences  help  to
dephallicize  it’  (Bersani  2010: 77–8).  If  the  penis  can  be  dephallicized  even  in  its
occurrence, that is to say if it can exist without symbolizing power and authority, then
the question that can be posed from the gendered reporting of violence committed by
and on hijra bodies is this: what does law achieve by reading the physiological penis as
the symbolic phallus or by equating the penis with maleness and in turn with criminality?
24 It seems to me that the hijra penis, when accused of murder and in turn of nakliness,
enables  the  courts  to  arrive  at  an  association  between  maleness  and  murder.  This
association brings forth a confrontation in which psychoanalysis throws into sharp relief
the problem of law’s epistemological foundation. While the Oedipal tragedy makes ‘visible
the unconscious foundation of the symbolic life,’ law grapples precisely with the problem
of ‘representing the question of tragedy, the ancient discourse of destiny summoning
Oedipus’  (Legendre  1998: 178–86).  Let  me  first  anchor  the  pertinence  of  the  Oedipal
drama in order to understand the asli-nakli dynamic that I have shown pervades not just
hijra aspirations for authenticity but other social processes as well,  such as the legal
understanding of violence.
25 In the South Asian case, Robert Goldman contests the absence of the Oedipal tragedy in
Sanskrit epics and writes,
To Be Some Other Name: The Naming Games that Hijras Play
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 12 | 2015
10
For it is my strong feeling that in exclusively relying upon the manifest or stated
relationships in many important episodes,  scholars have tended to overlook the
very marked tendency in some types of Oedipal story towards the substitution of
various male figures, notably the guru or aged brahman sage, and to a much lesser
extent the elder brother, for the father and female figures such as the guru’s wife,
the sister-in-law, and often a cow, for the mother (1978: 327).
He further reminds us of the legitimacy of substitution by remarking that,
It  was  in  fact  the  recognition  of  such  substitutions  that  led  Freud  to  his  most
fundamental discoveries about the operation of the unconsciousness and therefore
about the science of psychoanalysis itself. For it was his realization that the figures
of  friends,  colleagues,  etc.  in  his  dreams and those of  his  patients  were in  fact
representations  of  parental  and  other  important  figures  that  enabled  him  to
produce The Interpretation of Dreams (Goldman 1978: 367 n. 16).
It  is  thus only by substituting actual  fathers for father figures,  more specifically the
brother,  that  we  can  see  the  epics  Ramayana  and  Mahabharata  as  tales  of  Oedipal
violence  and  tragedy.  Let  us  return  to  Legendre’s  provocation  that  psychoanalysis
renders impossible a legal rendition of tragedy. We can see how the hijra criminal results
in an analogous dilemma. If the hijra is expected to be asocial, an ascetic who has walked
away from the duties of the householder, forsaken the oedipal tragedy and its promising
futurity, then how is her criminality to be understood in terms other than nakliness given
that her asliness is defined by her incorruptibility?13 Legendre writes that ‘It is in light of a
textual  arrangement  of  spacing  necessary  for  the  life  of  a  representation,  for  the
reproduction  of  the  animal  that  speaks,  that  the  function  of  reference  may  be
apprehended as a logical function of society. Such a function has as its task to put into
play, in the unconscious representations of the subject, the power to institute separation
by words.  We are concerned with the essence of  the symbolic function’  (181–2).  The
essence of the phallus with which the court cases and police reports imbue and refer to
the hijra penis not only consolidates a certain idea of maleness but also configures the
hijra within a normative oedipal development and thus render her nakli.
 
The incorruptibility of the asli hijra
26  The figure of the hijra politician serves as the perfect foil for the hijra criminal because,
if the latter is made nakli because of her criminality, the former is mimetically constituted
as incorruptible and hence asli. Hijra politicians never stand on their male names. They
are  not  only  made  famous  through  their  female  names  but  their  hijraness  and
consequently their incorruptibility depends on those names and on the breaking from
one set of obligations signified by the male name and the taking on of another through
female ones such as Shabnam Mausi, Asha Devi, Manisha Aai, and most recently Madhu
Kinnar, the elected mayor of Raigarh. Apart from such well-documented and spectacular
instances of hijras attaining political offices, many more local instances were visible in
rural Orissa. During the course of my fieldwork I was taken to meet a hijra in her mid
fifties who had won elections at  the block level.  While in our brief  conversation she
emphasized that she was elected because people knew she was honest and hard-working,
the government officer who had taken me to meet her rehearsed the logic that it was
because she could not  have a family that  she was incorruptible.  Similarly,  Jaina and
Azgari, who were the oldest and senior most hijras in Bhadrak were often called upon to
sit on local neighborhood committees that oversee the management of funds collected for
local  celebrations,  precisely because of  their purported incorruptibility.  The different
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connotations of the male and the female name for defining hijra identity in the eyes of
the  state  point  towards  the  wider  gender  dynamics  that  inform  judicial  and
administrative reasoning and thus the limits of the subjunctive that ritual tries to enact
through the name changing practices of the hijras.
 
Conclusion
27 Based on extended fieldwork among the hijras and an assembling of legal documents in
which hijras were implicated as criminals, I have argued that the multiple names that
hijras take during their life course index changes in bodies, kinship status, and position
within their  social  milieu.  These name-changing practices also encode the erosion of
relationships and the hopes for new and different futures. But as subjects of the state,
hijras’ multiple names create problem for both it and them. The state, as we have seen,
seeks to render hijras commensurable with its technologies of government. The male
names of hijras in the legal documents that I examined not only reveal the dynamic of asli
-nakli but also  the  imagination  of  violence  as  quintessentially  male  in  the  juridical
unconscious. I  read the juridical interpretation of hijras as criminals to argue for the
relevance  of  psychoanalytical  theories  in  thinking  about  law  and  representation.
Paradoxically, the social field is drawn between the criminality of the nakli hijra and the
incorruptibility  of the  asli  hijra.  If  names  are  actualizations  of  different
phenomenological, juridical and temporal properties of the person that move between
the public and the private, the generic and the singular, then the volatility of hijra names
provides us with a unique perspective on the movement between the subjunctive and the
actual, the real and its doubles, through which relationships are sustained and destroyed.
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NOTES
1. For  a  recent  discussion of  this  shifting  criteria  making amongst  hijras,  please  see  Delwar
Hussain (2013). Though Hussain was talking about hijras who eke out a living through sex work
on the India-Bangladesh border, it shows the persistence and widespread nature of the concern
with identifying real hijras.
2. Gayatri Reddy, defines izzat as follows: ‘A Farsi word originally, the term izzat refers most
closely to the constellation of meanings glossed in English as honor or respect’ and shows how it
is used by hijras to evaluate their status, identity, practice and behavior (2006, 487).
3. I explore the spatial organization of hijra communities in Bhadrak and the multiple relations
they maintained with their formally wedded wives, their husbands and male lovers many of who
were also their clients, in my PhD dissertation (see Saria 2014).
4. The guru-cela relationship that is  characteristic of hijra kinship seeks to replace biological
kinship and thus requires hijras to renounce their familial duties; how successful this endeavor is
an important topic to study but is outside the purview of this article.  The relationship is an
important marker of hijras’ asceticism and thus also a qualification of being ritual-specialists.
Both Gayatri Reddy (2005) and Serena Nanda (1999) have studied this extensively. Not every guru-
cela relationship seeks to replace biological kinship; some actually aim to supplement it. Please
see Copeman & Ikegame (2012) for other models of the guru-cela relationship.
5. Please see Cohen (2005) for a description and analysis of such a contest over accusations of
being nakli.
6. Nati-celas are disciples of the disciple of the guru. They are analogous to grandchildren or natis.
7. On the subjunctive character of ritual see Puett (2014).
8. The word Kinnar itself refers to a hijra but it is an attempt to accrue more respect than the
word hijra which is a word thrown around pejoratively amongst non-hijras.
9. I gratefully acknowledge the help of Pratiksha Baxi, Sruti Chaganti, and Pooja Satyogi who
have helped me track and understand these legal documents.
10. Gayatri  Reddy  has  documented  that  in  the  hijra  household  in  Hyderabad  where  she
conducted her fieldwork hijras were often recorded in the archive of the hijra household with
Muslim male names irrespective of their religion even when they were given hindu female names
upon initiation. Though these names were not used or circulated for addressing the hijra till they
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reached the level of the seniority of a nayak in the hierarchy or hijra social organization, they
served the purpose of consolidating the inheritance of and identification with Islam of the hijras
rather than maleness. This was reflected in the fact that the hijras who were members of a hijra
gharana in Orissa would also have Muslim names recorded but female ones and once again they
were recorded but not circulated. The fact that the legal documents show no concern for such a
carefully administered circulation of the male name, which once again is not the male name that
hijras were given at birth, let alone an alias, reveals the jurispathic tendencies of law. Robert
Cover (1986) has argued ‘that judges of the state are jurispathic—that they kill the diverse legal
traditions that compete with the state’ (1610). The fact that in the legal documents I have cited
there is no mention of hijra rituals and Hindu male names are recorded as well as Muslim ones,
without the clarification of where and how those names were acquired reveal a commitment to a
certain idea of biology at the expense of the fact that hijras themselves might have a different
relationship to violence through which they would gauge justice and culpability.
11. The familiarity between the police officers and the hijras resulted not only from the regular
harassment  for  bribes  but  also  because  Bhadrak,  Jajpur  and  Bhawanipatna  (the  district
headquarter of Kalahandi) were small towns. The regularity of such harassment meant only that
this  violence was gratuitous given that  the police already knew who was castrated and who
wasn’t.
12. I would like to thank one of my reviewers who pointed out that nakli could also mean ‘copy’
or ‘imitation’ from its usage in Urdu and not just false which is the way it is used in Hindi. This
allows me to note that often in the marketplaces of Bhadrak (which has the highest proportion of
the  Muslim  population  in  Orissa)  where  the  hijras  would  flirt  and  engage  in  very  sexual
conversations with men, the word nakli  would be used not so as to imply that the hijra was
actually a male person but that she was a ‘copy’ or an ‘imitation’ of a woman because she could
not give birth to children. Thus, in the contexts of intimacy and flirting the word nakli would be
used by men to provoke hijras into inviting them to try and get them pregnant. For example, the
protocols of flirting would be as follows: A young man might say to a hijra, ‘oh what can you give
me? You are not a real woman, can you get pregnant?’ The hijra might respond and say, ‘Why
don’t you try and get me pregnant?’ or ‘You can’t get me pregnant because your own weapon is
not  working and you are blaming me.’  In  the context  of violence though,  nakli  would imply
falseness indicative of corruption. Please see Saria (forthcoming).
13. Hijras claim to be incorruptible because of their asceticism. The discourse they deploy to
ratify  their  incorruptibility  understands the existence of  family  as  pressing a  moral  force of
kinship that explains if not excuses the corruption of people, specifically of politicians. Hijras are
not  the  only  people  who  equate  the  lack  of  family  and  biological  kinship  with  the  lack  of
corruption; several politicians also claim such a vantage point to make a case to garner votes
during elections. I shall be discussing the figure of the hijra politician in the next section. Please
see Gayatri Reddy (2003) and Lawrence Cohen (2004) for a discussion of the figure of the hijra
politician.
ABSTRACTS
This  article  begins  by  studying  the  ritualized  changing  of  names  that  hijras  undertake  and
proposes that we understand them as a subjunctive, which is to say that these rituals create an
order in which names and the selves they entail can be shed for new ones. I then show that the
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failure of this subjunctive mode of fashioning one’s past and future is met in its confrontation
with the law, which names the hijra in a discernible pattern in order to locate criminality and
identity with her male name. I argue that this implication of maleness reveals a commitment not
only to biology and sex but also an Oedipal understanding of violence. This understanding links
naming with the dynamic of asli (real) and nakli (false) and draws a social field between the two
through the figures of the hijra politician and the hijra criminal.
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